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INTRODUCTION
Without § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, there would
likely be no proliferation of message boards, no YouTube, and, much
to the chagrin of laptop-equipped third-year law students, no
Facebook. Section 230 allows Internet service providers (ISPs) and
interactive website providers (collectively "operators") to host online
content created by others without risking several types of civil liability. The statute has earned acclaim for its role in aiding the Internet's
explosive growth.' Until now, § 230 scholarship has examined the
propriety and proper scope of § 230 immunity. 2 This Article addresses the statute's impact on the law of contract.
t Law Clerk, Hon. Robert N. Hunter, Jr., North Carolina Court of Appeals; J.D.
(2010), Campbell University School of Law; B.S. (2006), East Carolina University.
Many thanks to Sarah Ludington, Lucas Osborn, Eric Goldman, and Tom Davis for
their thoughtful suggestions and encouragement. The views expressed in this Article
do not reflect those of Judge Hunter or the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
1. Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. American Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 583, 610 (2008) (crediting a broad interpretation of § 230 with allowing the
Internet, and particularly Web 2.0 websites, to flourish).
2. See, e.g., Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com:
A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563 (2009); Aaron
Jackson, Note, Cyberspace ... The Final Frontier:How the Communications Decency
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Courts have long impinged on the freedom of contract by voiding
contracts, or parts of contracts, when they run contrary to public policy.' Section 230 presents a unique situation: if the performances or
underlying conduct related to a contract violate a substantive area of
law, but the operator is nevertheless immunized from liability, courts
are faced with conflicting public policies when one party seeks to have
the contract voided because it is violative of public policy. The statute
encourages the operator's conduct, while the underlying substantive
law simultaneously discourages the content provider's conduct. This
Article argues courts should favor operators by employing a "onesided-void-for-public-policy" approach: these contracts should generally be voidable at the operator's-but not the content provider'soption. This approach will inure to the benefit of operators that take
advantage of § 230's rules. Creative operators can ensure they are not
the "developers" of a significant amount of content on their websites,
thereby affording them a contractual advantage over the content
providers responsible for the material.
By its very nature, § 230 creates public policy conflicts.' In Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C.,1
and Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist,Inc.,' for example, the public policy rationales behind § 230

and the Fair Housing Act (FHA) were sharply at odds. While the
FHA seeks to stamp out religious bias (and other biases) in the housing market by punishing those who publish prohibited preferences in
housing advertisements, § 230 prevents an operator's prospective liability when the advertisement originates from another source: "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."' Section 230 is fully introduced in Part I
of this Article, where the policy objectives behind the statute and case
Act Allows Entrepreneurs To Boldly Go Where No Blog Has Gone Before, 5 OKLA.
J.L. & TECH. 45 (2009); Ziniti, supra note 1, at 610; Brandy Jennifer Glad, Comment,
Determining What Constitutes Creation or Development of Content Under the Communications Decency Act, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 247 (2004); Bryan J. Davis, Comment,
Untangling the "Publisher" Versus "Information Content Provider" Paradox of 47
US. C. § 230: Toward a Rational Application of the Communications Decency Act in
Defamation Suits Against Internet Service Providers,32 N.M. L. REV. 75 (2002); Barry
J. Waldman, Comment, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the Internet, a Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Collins v. Blantern, (1767) 95 Eng. Rep. 850, 854; 2 Wils. K.B. 347,
350.
4. For § 230 immunity to arise, an operator must be trying to avoid liability for an
action that would result in legal sanction or liability for a non-operator. Naturally, the
policy behind § 230 and "real-world" laws inherently conflict.
5. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
6. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
7. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
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law interpreting it are discussed. Part II explains how current online
advertising services, such as Google's Adwords, function and how
they fit into the § 230 immunity scheme.
To explain why courts should favor operators, Part III utilizes the
policy tension between § 230 and the FHA that can arise in the context of an online advertising contract. Suppose, for example, a brickand-mortar advertising agency entered into a contract through which
the agency would post housing advertisements on the operator's website. If the rental agency expressed religious preferences in its ads,
would either party be able to avoid contractual enforcement by asserting the contract is violative of public policy? Part III demonstrates
that in most situations, operators-and only operators-should be
able to avoid contractual obligations on public policy grounds.
Section 189 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a
test for evaluating whether public policy should bar the enforcement
of a particular promise. (Going forward, the restatements are referred to as the "First Restatement" and the "Second Restatement.")
Section III.A explains how that framework functions and why it is a
superior approach to that of the First Restatement. Section III.B
demonstrates that when § 230 immunizes an operator from liability
for illegal third-party content closely related to a contract between the
operator and a content provider, the contract should generally be
voidable at the option of the operator-not the content provider. Finally, other applications of this one-sided approach as well as a variety
of implications for the media are discussed in Section III.C.
I. SECTION 230: THE STATUTE AND ITS CASE LAW
This part lays the groundwork for the rest of the Article. Section A
explains how a New York trial court decision led to § 230's enactment.
Section A also explains how operators can obtain immunity and how
they can lose it, as well as the policy considerations that shaped the
statute. Section B provides a discussion of the evolving contours of
§ 230 immunity.
A.

Section 230 Basics: Why it was Enacted, How it Works, and the
Policy Considerations behind the Statute

Section 230 is seen as the congressional response to Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,' a New York defamation case.

In Stratton Oakmont, the New York Supreme Court held that Prodigy,
an ISP, was the publisher of all user-generated messages on an online

message board because Prodigy exercised editorial control over the
8. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 137, 137-39 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230).
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content of web postings.9 To circumvent the potential impact of this
decision, Congress enacted § 230 as part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.10

Under subsection (c)(1), "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider."n
Subsection (c)(1) effectively defeats an element of a claim that requires the defendant-operator to be treated as a publisher. However,
the statute's definitional subsection, subsection (f), carves out an exception to that immunity: an "information content provider" is defined as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part,
for the creation or development of information provided through the

Internet or any other interactive computer service." 12 Note that subsection (c)(1) only exempts an operator from being treated as the publisher of content provided by "another content provider." By
developing online content "in whole or in part," an operator can also
be classified as an information content provider, losing its immunity.
Thus, there are three critical elements of a § 230(c)(1) defense: (1) the
operator must be a user or provider of an interactive computer service; (2) the plaintiff's theory of recovery must require the operator to
be treated as a "publisher or speaker"; and (3) the operator cannot be
an "information content provider" of the content the plaintiff is seeking to attribute to that operator.13
Congress set forth five general policy objectives:
9. Id. at *5. In an earlier New York district court case, the court discussed the
rationale for treating a website like newspaper:
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional
news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability
to an electronic news distributor such as CompuServe than that which is
applied to a public library, book store, or newsstand would impose an undue
burden on the free flow of information. Given the relevant First Amendment considerations, the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to
CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements.
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
10. Representative Cox, who proposed § 230 along with Representative Wyden,
made the following comments about the Stratton Oakmont decision:
Mr. Chairman, that is backward. We want to encourage people like Prodigy,
like CompuServe, like America Online, like the new Microsoft network, to
do everything possible for us, the customer, to help us control, at the portals
of our computer, at the front door of our house, what comes in and what our
children see. This technology is very quickly becoming available, and in fact
every one of us will be able to tailor what we see to our own tastes.
[Our approach] will protect [online service providers] from taking on liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York .

141

. ..

REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
12. Id. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
13. Ziniti, supra note 1, at 610.
CONG.
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(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter
and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by
means of computer.' 4
The congressional findings lauded the Internet's educational, intellectual, and cultural value," and stated that "[tlhe Internet and other
interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all

Americans, with a minimum of government regulation." 1 6
Limiting government interference with the Internet was a primary
motive behind enacting § 230. The Senate approved an alternate proposal that provided very limited immunity, but the House rejected it."

House floor comments by Representatives Cox and Wyden, the architects of the statute, indicate § 230's immunity was intended to be part
of a larger laissez faire approach to Internet regulation (or a lack
thereof), by allowing Internet entrepreneurs to operate free of certain
constraints imposed by "real-world" civil liability regimes. 8
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
15. Id. § 230(a)(1), (3), (5).
16. Id. § 230(a)(4). This finding has been particularly influential with the courts.
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the court placed heavy emphasis on subsection
(a)(4), concluding Congress intended for the Internet to remain free of government
interference. 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
17. See Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights
and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. the Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 805, 822-23 (2007).
18. Representative Wyden contrasted § 230 with the rejected Senate approach:
Now what the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] and I have proposed
does stand in sharp contrast to the work of the other body. They seek there
to try to put in place the Government rather than the private sector about

this task of trying to define indecent communications and protecting our
kids. In my view that approach, the approach of the other body, will essentially involve the Federal Government spending vast sums of money trying

to define elusive terms that are going to lead to a flood of legal challenges
while our kids are unprotected. ...
Mr. Chairman, the new media is simply different. We have the opportunity to build a 21st century policy for the Internet employing the technologies and the creativity designed by the private sector.

141

CONG.

REc. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden) (alteration in original).

Representative Cox made a similar point with the following comments:
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Before proceeding further, it is important to note that § 230 has no
impact on intellectual property law.19 As such, this Article has no
bearing on contract actions involving trademark infringement or any
other intellectual property issues.20 Section 230 also provides another
form of immunity that is largely beyond the scope of this Article: subsection (c)(2) provides civil immunity for actions taken in good faith
to restrict access to objectionable material. 2 1 For the most part, this
Article is limited to discussing subsection (c)(1) immunity.
B. Section 230 Case Law
Courts have generally concluded § 230 confers broad immunity on
operators. They have not opted for a strict, literal reading of the definitional exception contained in subsection (f). 2 2 The difficult inquiry
for the courts has been determining what amount of development is
required to trigger the exception. Courts have held that establishing a
network of message boards, 23 a dating profile network, 24 and an openended commercial bulletin board, such as Craigslist.com, 25 are insufficient. The defendants in these cases certainly developed the underlying content to some extent, which would seem to make them content
Mr. Chairman, our amendment will do two basic things: First, it will protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who provides a front end to
the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to screen indecency and offensive material for
their customers. It will protect them from taking on liability such as occurred in the
Prodigy case in New York that they should not face for helping us and for helping us
solve this problem. Second, it will establish as the policy of the United States that we
do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the
Internet, that we do not wish to have a Federal Computer Commission with an army
of bureaucrats regulating the Internet because frankly the Internet has grown up to be
what it is without that kind of help from the Government. In this fashion we can
encourage what is right now the most energetic technological revolution that any of us
has ever witnessed. We can make it better. We can make sure that it operates more
quickly to solve our problem of keeping pornography away from our kids, keeping
offensive material away from our kids, and I am very excited about it.
Id. (statement of Rep. Cox).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.").
20. The relationship between operator liability and intellectual property infringement is an intriguing area of law in its own right. For an explanation of the intentbased liability scheme endorsed by the Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), a significant copyright-infringement case,

see, Jane C. Ginsburg, Separatingthe Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats: Reckoning
the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50
ARIZ. L. REv. 577 (2008), and Ziniti, supra note 1, at 608.

21. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
22. Recall that information content providers are not entitled to immunity and
that § 230 describes them as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or

any other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
23. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997).
24. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
25. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
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providers, and therefore outside the protection of § 230. A dating
website encourages people to post their personal information, and a
financial message board certainly "develops" the message board's
content by promoting a focused theme of discussion. Fortunately,
courts have not opted for this literal reading of the statute.2 6
In FairHousing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,

LLC, the Ninth Circuit refined the inquiry, concluding the exception
applies when an operator "contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct." 2 7 The Ninth Circuit test, which this Article
calls the "underlying illegality test," takes a moderate approach. The
test accounts for the inherent tension created by the definitional exception to immunity. The word "develop" is not read literally, but on
the other hand, subsection (c)(1) is not treated as a source of unlimited immunity.2 8 Chief Judge Kozinski articulated this balanced approach to immunity:
26. A literal reading of the word "develop" would defeat the purpose of the statute and would fail to recognize that Congress intended to avoid the result of the
Stratton Oakmont decision. Read out of context, a message board moderator that
edits postings can be said to "develop" the message board itself-including all of its
content. Because this is what occurred in Stratton Oakmont, see supra text accompanying notes 8-10, the word "develop" cannot include basic editorial functions.
27. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521
F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008).
28. Several commentators have rejected the underlying illegality test, arguing the
Roommates.com decision runs contrary to congressional intent. These critiques appear to suggest absolute immunity is appropriate when a third party creates content,
but seem to ignore the possibility that operators can themselves be content providers
by substantially collaborating with another party that is the primary content provider.
One commentator, for example, has argued the court clearly ran afoul of congressional intent:
Yet the majority feels that the policy scheme articulated by Congress has
reached its expiration date and must therefore be altered. The Roommates.
com decision contradicts Congress's clearly stated intent to immunize [operators], which was affirmed not only during the enactment of the statute but
also after courts had an opportunity to interpret section 230.
Defterderian, supra note 2, at 585. Defterderian argues the endorsement of Zeran
and other pre-Roommates.com decisions by the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce in 2002 demonstrates Roommates.com clearly broke with congressional
intent. Id. Indeed, the House Committee did endorse these decisions: "The courts
have correctly interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at protecting against liability for such claims as negligence and defamation . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 13
(2002) (citations omitted). This does not, however, demonstrate the decision ran contrary to congressional intent as Representatives Cox and Wyden originally expressed
it or when the House Committee endorsed Zeran and several other cases.
First, the statements by Cox and Wyden certainly espouse a laissez faire regulatory
approach, but they do not describe the extent of § 230 immunity. See supra note 18
(quoting 141 CONG. REc. 22,045 (1995) (statements of Rep. Wyden and Rep. Cox)).
Gushing over the value of the Internet and the importance of keeping government
away from it is by no means stating that operators should be granted near-absolute
immunity. Second, the House Committee's endorsement of Zeran, which spoke of
"broad immunity," Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331, did not reject the approach taken six years
later in Roommates.com. In retrospect, Zeran was not a close case. There, the plaintiff brought suit against AOL when AOL failed to remove offensive postings to an
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Where it is very clear that the website directly participates in developing the alleged illegality .. . immunity will be lost. But in cases of
enhancement by implication or development by inference-such as
with respect to the "Additional Comments" here-section 230 must
be interpreted to protect websites not merely from ultimate liability,
but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles. 2 9
More specifically, the court held that "a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it
contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct."3 0
The test allows for significant development of an interactive website
(such as focusing the website's theme) but prevents operators from
requiring content providers to engage in illegal conduct in order to use
the website. So while an operator like Facebook might encourage its
users to make "wall-postings" and create "pages," it is not liable for a
defamatory wall posting simply because the entity encourages users to
post. The Roommates.com decision also provided guidelines regarding the extent of development required to trigger the exception. The
court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's Chicago Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,Inc. decision,31 holding
the exception is not triggered by content created by content providers
through the use of open-ended text boxes.32 Mandatory drop-down
menus, however, are a different story. When drop-down menus conAOL message board after being notified of their existence. Id. at 328-30. Nothing in
the decision indicates AOL solicited or required the third parties to create illegal
content, as was the case with the operator in Roommates.com. See Roommates.com,
521 F.3d at 1165 ("Similarly, Roommates requires subscribers listing housing to disclose whether there are 'Children present' or 'Children not present' and requires
housing seekers to say 'I will live with children' or 'I will not live with children.'").
Neither Zeran nor any other decision had tested the definition of "develop" as the
facts did in Roommates.com. Therefore, Congress's endorsement of Zeran cannot be
seen as a rejection of the underlying illegality approach.
Furthermore, the underlying illegality test still provides broad immunity so long as
courts do not adopt a strict liability approach-and the weight of § 230 case law indicates such an approach is not forthcoming. Cf infra note 37 (explaining that the decision has been cited predominantly in decisions siding with defendants); infra note 35
(discussing the possibility of a strict liability version of the underlying illegality test).
But cf infra note 50 (discussing a recent case that held for the plaintiff in a § 230 case
and referring to a commentator's concern that this case might disrupt § 230 case law).
The word "develop" is still not interpreted literally-operators can still promote, edit,
and otherwise substantially develop their websites provided they do not develop underlying illegality. And while it lacks the simplicity of a bright line approach, the
underlying illegality approach gives meaning to the word "develop." The alternative
would be to pretend subsection (f)(1) does not even apply to operators, which would
truly run contrary to congressional intent. Perhaps most importantly, Roommates.
com has not lead to a host of operator-hostile decisions. See infra note 37 (explaining
that the decision has been cited predominantly in decisions siding with defendants).
29. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174-75.
30. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
31. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,

519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
32. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.
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taining pre-populated answers must be completed to create a profile,
which was the case in Roommates.com, an "illegal" answer provided
by the user may be attributed to the operator. 3 3 Essentially, the operator is forcing the user to provide the content-even though no one is
forcing the user to use the website. Logically, this analysis would extend to a pre-populated drop-down menu that must be completed to
advance through many online processes, such as the creation of an
advertisement.
The underlying illegality test is, of course, not a perfect solution,
and it is currently rather rough around the edges. The courts have not
explained whether operators are necessarily liable for all pre-populated content, since the drop-down menus in Roommates.com contained clearly illegal responses.3 4 Liability might depend on the
likelihood a drop-down menu will create illegal content. For instance,
consider a mandatory menu that contains twenty legal responses and
one illegal response. If the illegal answer was clearly illegal on its
face, it seems the operator would be unworthy of § 230 protection. If
the answer was illegal only in combination with a user's response to
other mandatory questions (i.e., latent illegality), the outcome might
be different." But despite its imperfections, 6 courts from multiple
circuits have cited the Roommates.com decision (largely in favor of
defendants) suggesting that, fortunately for operators, it is emerging
as the dominant approach.
33. Id. at 1116, 1166-68. The court stated that "b]y requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited
set of pre-populated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of
that information." Id. at 1116.
34. See id. at 1165 ("Roommate requires subscribers to specify, using a drop-down
menu provided by Roommate, whether they are 'Male' or 'Female' and then displays
that information on the profile page.").
35. This discussion raises the specter of pre-populated content strict liability, under
which an operator could be liable for any pre-populated menu selection it provides
for the user. While strict liability would help alleviate the uncertainty injected by
latently and contextually illegal pre-populated content, it would wreak havoc on the
viability of a variety web-based business models, a result the underlying illegality approach avoids by allowing judges to take a more nuanced approach. Cf Hattie
Harman, Note, Drop-down Lists and the Communications Decency Act: A Creation
Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 166-67 (2009) (recognizing that a strict liability
approach "eliminates the court's ability to examine the nuances presented by a particular piece of content in context," and discussing several other arguments against prepopulated strict liability).
36. For two alternate approaches to § 230 immunity, see, for example, id. at
170-74 (arguing for "A 'Safe Harbor'-style Rebuttable Presumption") and Zac
Locke, Comment, Asking For It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites that
Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 168-180
(2008) (arguing for a "Grokster-based inducement test").
37. As Professor Goldman's blog indicates, Roommates.com has overwhelmingly
been cited in favor of defendants as of December of 2009. Eric Goldman, Consumer
Review Website Wins 230 Dismissal in Fourth Circuit,TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING
LAW BLOG (Dec. 29, 2009, 2:53 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/
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§ 230

In order for the public policy conflict between § 230 and a substantive area of law to arise, the operator must first be entitled to § 230

immunity. This part considers online advertising business models that
are amendable to a § 230(c)(1) defense. There are a variety of online
advertising business models, the most prominent of which is the payper-click model." In 2009, Google generated $22.9 billion in advertising revenue. 39 Google AdWords (Google's main advertising product)
is a pay-per-click service, meaning advertisers generally pay when
users click on ads, rather than paying when each ad is displayed.4 0
Advertisers select certain keywords to associate with their advertisements, and when Google search engine users search for those
keywords, the user-appropriate ads may appear with the search results.41 The ad-creation process is almost entirely advertiser-drivenGoogle appears to have a relatively passive role.
In fact, the AdWords creation process seems tailor-made for
§ 230(c)(1) protection. The essential components of ads viewable to
Google users are created through the use of open text boxes. First, a
prospective advertiser must select a geographic region in which the ad

consumer review_1.htm (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-05 (9th
Cir. 2009); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Goddard
v. Google, Inc. (Goddard 11), 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Doe IX v.
MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Atl. Recording Corp. v.
Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); GW Equity L.L.C. v.
Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 9, 2009); Goddard v. Google, Inc. (Goddard I), No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008
WL 5245490, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008); Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. Furber, No.
CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4182827, at *9-10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008); Doe II
v. MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 157-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Joyner v. Lazzareschi, No. G040323, 2009 WL 695539, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2009); Shiamili
v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 892 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54-55 (App. Div. 2009)). Roommates.com was only cited twice for plaintiffs as of December of 2009. See id. (citing
FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); NPS L.L.C. v. StubHub, Inc.,
No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Jan. 26, 2009)). A Shepard's report
on the Roommates.com decision indicates this trend has continued in 2010.
38. Advertisers pay when users click their advertisement and are linked to a particular advertiser's website. Internet Advertising: The Ultimate Marketing Machine,
THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2006), http://www6.economist.com/background/displaystory.

cfm?story-id=7138905.
39. 2009 Financial Tables, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financial/2009/

tables.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
40. Google AdWords, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ads/adwords/ (last visited

Sept. 11, 2010).
41. Id. For instance, a florist might select "flowers" and "next day delivery" as its
keywords. Advertisers can improve the likelihood that their ad will appear by increasing the amount they are willing to pay for a "click." See Google, An Introduction
to Google AdWords, YouTUBE (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ufzoM59bIQ8.
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will be viewed.42 Next, the advertiser will enter information into open
text boxes labeled "Headline," "First descriptive line," "Second descriptive line," "Visible URL," and "Destination URL."43 The advertiser will then enter keywords (again, into an open text box) that will
be used to trigger the advertisement when a Google user uses those
keywords in a Google search.44 The various components are then automatically assembled into an ad and reviewed by Google employees.
Recall that under both Craigslist and Roommates.com, operators are
not the content providers of the content created through open text
boxes.4 5 Google's use of significant guidelines when reviewing the
content of the ads does not negate its immunity.4 6
Goddard v. Google, Inc., a 2009 federal district court decision, extended § 230(c)(1) immunity to Google's AdWords service.47 The
plaintiff was trying to hold Google liable for harm caused by allegedly
fraudulent AdWords advertisements.4 8 Drawing on the Roommates.com decision, the court stated that the defendant could have
prevailed if she could have established "that Google 'not only en42. See id. This is done through a mandatory drop-down menu, so under the
Roommates.com decision, Google is also a content-provider of the advertiser's geographic region selection.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 (discussing the Roommates.com decision and the Ninth Circuit's agreement with the Seventh Circuit on this point).
46. Cf Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10107, at *19 (D.D.C. May, 17 2004) (advertisement hosting operator not a content
provider when it included its website address on every advertisement, placed a watermark on all advertisement photographs, and categorized advertisements by subject
matter). An operator's knowledge of illegality does not make it responsible for the
illegal conduct. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., for example, the plaintiff alleged
that, because he had informed America Online (AOL) of the defamatory nature of
several postings and AOL had agreed to remove them, AOL was liable for failing to
remove the posting. 129 F.3d 327, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit panel
disagreed, concluding § 230 shielded AOL from being treated as a publisher. See id.
at 332-33. It follows that even if an operator reviews content, detects illegality, and
allows it to be posted on an interactive website, it is not liable for any illegality.
Section 230 actually seeks to enhance operators' ability to exercise editorial control
over user content. See supra Part I.A. (explaining the statute was passed in response
to a case that imposed liability because an operator exercised editorial control over
some, but not all, content). In fact, civil liability cannot be imposed for efforts to
restrict objectionable material:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected ....
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). It is unclear
whether the outright ban on civil liability covers content screening based on commercial or certain legal considerations; however, the statute certainly promotes the unfettered use of editorial control.
47. Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201-02 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
48. See id. at 1195.
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courage[d] illegal conduct, [but also] collaborate[d] in the development of the illegal content and, effectively, require[d] its advertiser
customers to engage in it.""' The plaintiff argued Google contributed
to the underlying illegality because the AdWords creation process
makes suggestions by matching words entered by users with words
chosen by advertisers while creating ads.50 The court rejected this argument because the plaintiff was not required to do anything.51 The
Goddard decision, which is an application of Roommates.com's under49. Id. at 1196 ("These allegations, if supported by other specific allegations of
fact, clearly would remove Plaintiff's action from the scope of CDA immunity.").
50. See id. at 1199 ("[P]laintiff alleges that Google effectively 'requires' advertisers
to engage in illegal conduct. Yet Plaintiff's use of the word 'requires' is inconsistent
with the facts that Plaintiff herself alleges. The purported 'requirement' flows from
Google's alleged 'suggestion' of the phrase 'free ringtone' through its Keyword Tool,
and from the MSSPs' purported knowledge that only 'free ringtones' generate substantial revenue-producing internet traffic.").
Shortly before this Article went to press, a Northern District of California decision
declined to extend the result in Goddard to a different set of facts. Briefly, in Swift v.
Zynga Game Network, Inc., the court denied two operator-defendants' motions to
dismiss on § 230 grounds because the court could not conclude the defendants were
not content providers based on the pleadings (the court also questioned whether one
defendant was an "interactive computer service provider"). C 09-05443 SBA, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117355, at *12-19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010). The court distinguished
Goddard, stating that the plaintiff had not alleged Zynga (one of the defendant-operators) was a neutral website and had alleged Zynga directly engaged in fraudulent
transactions that were the subject of the case. Id. at *17. The opinion indicates Zynga
operates social networking games, such as "Farmville," and hosted third-party advertisements within those games. The critical allegation for the court was that the advertisements were selling online currency that could be used to enhance one's
performance in online games. In order to obtain online currency, users had to complete transactions with third-party advertisers. The court found this could amount to
"material contribution" under the underlying illegality test. See id. at *15-16.
("Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged Zynga's 'material contribution' to the alleged unlawful activity by asserting that Zynga designed its games to intentionally create the
demand for the virtual currency offered in those games, and then used this demand to
lure consumers into the allegedly fraudulent transactions."). While the Swift court
declined to extend the Goddard approach, it does not disturb Goddard's application
to "neutral" advertising schemes like Google's Adwords. Professor Goldman has
sharply criticized the Swift decision, lamenting that it might bring out the worst in the
Roommates.com regime. See Eric Goldman, Ad Networks Can't Get 47 USC 230 Defense on Motion to Dismiss-Swift v. Zynga, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG

(Nov. 11, 2010, 1:01 PM).
51. See id. at 1199. The court's decision relied heavily on Roommates.com:
This reasoning fails to disclose a "requirement" of any kind, nor does it suggest the type of "direct and palpable" involvement that otherwise is required
to avoid CDA immunity. Such involvement might occur where a website
"remov[es] the word 'not' from a user's message reading '[Name] did not
steal the artwork' in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous
one.
Id. (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C.,
521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008)). "Even accepting Plaintiff's factual allegations as
true," the court continued, "the allegations do not come close to suggesting involvement at such a level, or, indeed, that Google's AdWords program was anything other
than 'a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes."' Id.
(quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172).
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lying illegality test, indicates that websites can avail themselves of
§ 230(c)(1) immunity by utilizing Google's approach to web adsutilizing open text boxes rather than mandatory drop-down menus in
the ad-creation process.
Facebook's advertising scheme is very similar to Google's. Advertisers create their ads through the use of open text boxes, which await
review by Facebook personnel.5 2 Advertisers can target Facebook
users through a variety of demographic characteristics supplied by
users on their profile pages." Although users provide much of this
information through pre-prepared answers contained in drop-down
menus, entering the information is not required. Therefore, the answers to these questions likely cannot be attributed to Facebook. 54
III.

ONE-SIDED PUBLIC POLICY PROTECrION

The First and Second Restatements of Contracts take markedly different approaches to the void-for-public-policy doctrine. Section A of
this part argues that, because deterrence is the superior rationale for
the void-for-public-policy doctrine, the Second Restatement's approach is the superior framework for evaluating contracts impacted by
§ 230. To explain why courts should favor operators when a party asserts the void-for-public-policy doctrine, Section B applies the Second
Restatement framework by pitting § 230's policy objectives against
the FHA's policy objectives. Section C explores other applications of
this one-sided approach and discusses implications for the media.
A.

Public Policy Framework

While courts often speak of the freedom of contract, the general
rule is that contracts will not be enforced when they run contrary to
public policy.56 Courts do not, however, apply the rule in an absolutist
manner.57 When a promise runs contrary to public policy, a promisee
52. See Facebook Advertising, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/advertising/?
src=pf (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
53. Id. Specifically, advertisers can target their audience by location, age, sex,
keywords, education, workplace, relationship status, relationship interests, and languages. Id.
54. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166 (holding that an operator's use of
mandatory drop-down menus that forced users to input illegal answers rendered the
operator content provider of the answers). Even if users were required to provide the
answers, Facebook could still argue that the answers themselves were not illegal.
Therefore, the argument goes, Facebook has not contributed to any underlying illegality that might be created when a particular advertisement uses personal information
for illegal purposes. This might be a close call.
55. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 284 (1972); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1972); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
56. See 15 GRACE McLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1, at 1 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).
57. See id. at 2.
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may still be able to bring an action for breach, and a promisor might
not succeed in defending on the grounds that the promise violates
public policy. Whether a court deems a promise unenforceable depends on the factors that cause the promise to be contrary to public
policy." Courts often use techniques falling "short of complete enforceability but also exceed[ing] complete unenforceability." 9 Unfortunately, when statutes do clearly annunciate a particular policy, they
often fail to address the enforceability of contracts related to the underlying criminal or tortious conduct.o Courts must then look to the
policy furthered by the statute or statutes in question and determine
whether "[the policy] would be offended by full or partial enforcement, or by some other remedy such as restitution."6 1 Even when a
legislature has explicitly declared a particular type of contract violates
public policy, some courts have permitted parties to enforce the offending promise, reasoning the statute was directed at the breaching
party.62 Some courts strictly refuse to enforce contracts involving conduct prohibited by statute, while others may enforce agreements related to legislatively prohibited activity. 63 This Article assumes courts
will take the latter approach.
There are a variety of rationales for refusing to enforce contracts
that conflict with public policy. One view-that enforcing illegal bargains is offensive to fundamental notions of judicial propriety and an
improper use of judicial resources-was eloquently expressed by an
English court, which declared, "No polluted hand shall touch the pure
fountains of justice." 64 Pragmatic courts, on the other hand, view deterrence as the purpose of refusing enforcement.
The deterrence rationale is more in tune with modern economic notions of contract theory that seek to make the promisee whole rather
58. See id. at 5.
59. Id.

60. For example, the FHA's "Declaration of Policy" statute declares that "[i]t is
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States," but no FHA provisions address contracts in
violation of that policy. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
61. See GIESEL, supra note 56, § 79.2, at 58.
62. See id. at 6.
63. Compare Henderson v. Kentwood Spring Water, Inc., 583 So. 2d 1227,
1232-33 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("Where a statute imposes a penalty on the doing of an
act without either prohibiting it or expressly declaring it illegal or void, generally an
agreement founded on or for doing of such penalized act is void."), with Duncan v.
Cannon, 561 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (enforcing a contract for the installation of a boiler despite the violation of an ordinance requiring plans for the
installation to be filed with a government agency).
64. Collins v. Blantern, (1767) 95 Eng. Rep. 850, 854; 2 Wils. K.B. 347, 350.
65. See Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1957) (stating
that the reason for nonenforcement is deterring future illegal conduct rather than
preventing unjust enrichment).
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than punishing the breaching promisor.6 6 Under this view, courts
should refuse enforcement when nonenforcement will deter illegal
conduct. They should tailor contractual remedies when absolute nonenforcement will not deter future illegal conduct or when it will
overdeter beneficial conduct. Unless enforcement occurs in the form
of specific performance,6 the effect of a court's decision will only
have a forward-looking impact. The non-breaching party has likely
already performed its promise that has facilitated illegal conduct, and
the breaching party has refused to perform its obligation. Therefore,
under this view, public policy will only be promoted by discouraging
future illegal actions or bargains.6 8
An economic efficiency analysis can help courts to ascertain
whether deterrence will actually occur and whether that level of deterrence should be pursued. That a contract will have negative external
effects does not necessarily mean that it is economically inefficient;
rather, inefficiency occurs when the harm to third parties exceeds the
net benefits to the contracting parties. 69 As one commentator has astutely explained, under economic theory analysis, courts should focus
on determining what "negative externalities" are created by the illegality and whether enforcement will lead to a net increase in social
welfare. 7 0 Thus, while a deterrence-grounded void-for-public-policy
doctrine can "punish" one party to some extent, it does not do so
unnecessarily, opting for the most economically efficient and socially
66. See, e.g., 24 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1, at 3-5 (4th
ed. 2002) ("[T]he disappointed promisee is generally entitled to an award of money
damages in an amount reasonably calculated to make him or her whole and neither
more nor less; any greater sum operates to punish the breaching promisor and results
in an unwarranted windfall to the promisee... ."); L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,
Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936) ("[O]ne
frequently finds the 'normal' rule of contract damages (which awards to the promisee
the value of the expectancy, 'the lost profit') treated as a mere corollary of a more
fundamental principle, that the purpose of granting damages is to make 'compensation' for injury.").
67. It is unlikely that a court will award specific performance when the desired
performance is illegal. Therefore, enforcement will likely be in the form of damages
in all but an extreme minority of cases.
68. See Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2006) [hereinafter Law and Economics] ("The decision
whether to enforce a contract will not change the externality associated with any particular case: either the act that causes the externality has occurred, or it has not and
will not occur unless the judge commands specific performance as the remedy. The
decision is therefore only useful insofar as it becomes precedent for future cases."). A
more complex approach is taken by Professor Kostritsky, who argues that despite the
variety of factors cited by courts in their calculus, many decisions can be explained by
and should be determined by "efficient deterrence" considerations. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence:A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74
IOWA L. REV. 115 (1988). She posits that the risk of nonenforcement should be
placed on the "cheapest cost avoider." Id. at 122.
69. Law and Economics, supra note 68, at 1447.
70. Id. at 1448.
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beneficial result. When it will hinder public policy objectives, courts
should eschew nonenforcement.
The judicial propriety rationale, while not without merit,7 can have
a punitive effect. Courts subscribing solely to this theory would likely
opt for nonenforcement in most situations or resort to giving undue
weight to distaste for any illegality present in the contract, rather than
the deterrent effect of nonenforcement. This conflicts with the general rule that contract remedies are designed to make the non-breaching party whole, rather than to punish the breaching party.
The First and Second Restatements of Contracts handle public-policy violations in different ways: one defines types of prohibited contracts ad nauseum; the other provides a malleable balancing test. The
Second Restatement is the superior framework because it provides
the flexibility to evaluate nonenumerated scenarios and encourages
courts to evaluate the deterrent effect of nonenforcement. As one
eminent treatise explains, the First Restatement speaks of illegal bargains while the Second Restatement utilizes a more flexible, publicpolicy-oriented approach.7 2 Under the First Restatement, "'[a] party
to an illegal bargain can neither recover damages for breach thereof,
nor, by rescinding the bargain, recover the performance .. . thereunder or its value,' subject to various exceptions."" In contrast to the
balancing-test approach utilized by the Second Restatement, 74 the
First Restatement goes to great lengths enumerating various illegal
bargains.75 This list includes, among other things, bargains in restraint
of trade, 76 illegal wagers, 7 7 usurious bargains,7 and bargains made or
to be performed on Sundays. 79 And just as the First Restatement defines illegal bargains ad nauseam, it also lists numerous exceptions to
its general rule of refusing enforcement of illegal bargains.so
Section 178 of the Second Restatement provides that a contract
should be unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable, or when "the interest in its enforcement
is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms."" In determining the interest in favor
of enforcing a term, courts are to weigh three factors: (1) the parties'
justified expectations; (2) any resulting forfeiture if enforcement were
71.
public
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

For example, enforcing contracts enveloped in illegality could foster a negative
perception of the courts.
5 LORD, supra note 66, § 12:4, at 954-58 (2009).
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 598 (1932)).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 513-597.
See id. §§ 513-519.
See id. H§ 520-525.
See id. 0 526-537.
See id. §§ 538-539.
See id. §§ 599-609.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
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denied; and (3) any special interest in favor of enforcement. 82 In
weighing the policy against enforcement the court should consider the
following: (1) the strength of the policy's legislative or judicial manifestation; (2) the likelihood that refusal will further that policy; (3) the
seriousness of any misconduct, and whether it was deliberate; and (4)
the degree of the connection between the misconduct and the term.
To illustrate, consider Davies v. Grossmont Union High School Dis-

trict, a Ninth Circuit decision utilizing the Second Restatement approach to refuse enforcement of a contractual term restricting an
individual's right to run for public office. 8 4 The source of the contractual term was a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff school district paid to settle several claims in exchange for the defendant's
promise (among others) never to work for or run for an elected office
with the school district." When the defendant was elected to the
school board, the school board brought an action to enforce the contract, and the district court held the defendant in contempt.8 6 A Ninth
Circuit panel reversed, holding enforcement of the clause violated the
defendant's constitutional right to hold office, as well as the constitutional right of the public to elect him.8 1 The court stated that restricting an individual's right to run for office must further a compelling
state interest. The interest in favor of settling litigation (embodied
by the settlement contract) and the district's purported right to protect voters from the defendant's unpleasantness and policy objectives
was insufficient to tip the scales in favor of enforcement.8 9 The court
explained that enforcing the term would cause substantial social harm
because these types of agreements would corrupt the political process,
since school board members were effectively settling claims to ensure
their incumbency.90
The American Law Institute's (ALI) decision to omit a lengthy list
of illegal bargains and exceptions and largely rely on judicial interpretations of public policy is certainly a significant change. But while the
First Restatement relied on defining illegal bargains with specificity, it
also stated that an illegal bargain can be classified as such when its
formation or performance is "criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed
to public policy."9 1 The substantial grant of freedom to interpret and
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991).
85. See id. at 1392.
86. Id. at 1393.
87. Id. at 1396.
88. Id. at 1397.
89. Id. at 1398.
90. See id. at 1398-99 ("As harmful as such agreements are in general, they are
particularly offensive where, as here, the parties authorizing the payment are elected
officials and the recipient is a potential political opponent. This sort of arrangement is
a serious abuse of the power of incumbency.").
91. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932) (emphasis added).
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weigh public policy under the Second Restatement's approach is obviously subject to criticism. As one court famously stated, public policy
"is a very unruly horse, and when you once get astride it you never
know where it will carry you. "92
Yet the Second Restatement's approach is superior for evaluating
the impact of public policy under modern contract theory, and more
specifically, e-commerce transactions. The First Restatement relies on
a predetermined group of illegal bargains. And while § 512 provides a
catchall, it provides no means for evaluating when a contract is "otherwise opposed to public policy," 93 suggesting the ALI drafters
viewed it as an afterthought. While neither restatement's drafters
likely contemplated Internet transactions, the Second Restatement's
approach is designed with the flexibility to evaluate unanticipated
types of transactions. The First Restatement's approach, on the other
hand, relies on addressing every type of illegal bargain before it occurs. The FHA and § 230(c), particularly when they intersect, are
square pegs that cannot be forced through the First Restatement's
neat, round holes. Furthermore, the Second Restatement approach
accounts for, and is likely to arrive at, the most efficient result in accord with modern economic contract theory. Evaluating the interests
in favor of enforcement and nonenforcement comports with an efficiency-based approach because it allows courts to evaluate the net social consequences of a potential remedy, thereby giving judges the
tools to ensure the most efficient result.
B.

Applying the Second Restatement's Approach

Section 230 tilts the playing field in favor of operators. The statute
exempts them from traditional liability regimes when they pass the
underlying illegality test, and § 230 policy values are generally advanced when operators avoid liability. While the policy objectives of
these traditional liability regimes may suffer to some extent when this
occurs, the void-for-public-policy doctrine advances traditional liability policy goals prospectively, by discouraging future illegal conduct.
If operators-who are favored by § 230 policy goals-are preferred
over content providers-who are disfavored both by § 230 and the
applicable liability regime-courts can simultaneously advance both
§ 230 and substantive liability policy objectives. This section tests this
argument by pitting § 230 policy goals against those of the FHA.
As one court noted, "The irony of public policy is that public policy
is never constant." 9 4 The intersection of the FHA and the Communications Decency Act is a prime example. The FHA prohibits publishing a housing advertisement, notice, or statement expressing a
92. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P.) 303.
93. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 512.
94. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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preference "based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination."" The FHA's "Declaration of Policy"
states "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."96
The FHA, however, fails to state whether contracts contrary to that
public policy may be enforced." On the other hand, § 230-enacted
about three decades after the FHA-reduces the FHA's reach and
can be construed as a shift in public policy. While the FHA prohibits
housing advertisements stating religious preferences, § 230 immunizes
the website operator, declaring the Internet should enjoy minimal
governmental interference.9 8 Of course, the content provider is without refuge from the FHA.99 Utilizing the Second Restatement's balancing test produces a different outcome depending on which party
brings an action for breach of contract.
1. When the Operator Seeks to Enforce a Contract
The pay-per-click models employed by Google and Facebook present a situation in which a breaching content provider might assert the
void-for-public-policy defense. Suppose the content provider uses the
ad-creation tools to input its desired advertisement components. The
advertisement is arguably facially neutral, so an advertisement
screener working for the operator would not detect any illegality from
simply viewing the advertisement. The advertisement reads: "Featured Home: $299,000 4BR 3.5 BA Several Christian churches nearby,
great family-values oriented neighborhood." The house is located in a
subdivision that will not allow non-Christians to purchase a home, and
the content provider intends for the advertisement to hint that this is
the case; thus, the advertisement likely violates the FHA by expressing a subtle, impermissible preference.100 After the operator hosts
95. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
96. Id. § 3601.
97. See id. §§ 3601-3619.
98. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
99. See id.
100. On its face, the advertisement might seem innocent enough; however, courts
have sided with plaintiffs in liberally interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (making it illegal
"[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination"). In Ragin v. New York Times Co., a leading FHA
case, the court declared that the statute covered both overt and subtle discrimination.
See 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Neither the text of the statute nor its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to exempt from its proscriptions subtle
methods of indicating racial preferences."). The court held that graphic advertisements "with models of a particular race and not others" can be sufficient to trigger
§ 3604(c) liability. See id. Guider v. Bauer bears a resemblance to our hypothetical.
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the advertisement, which is clicked numerous times, the content provider refuses to pay.
With regard to the interest in enforcing the terms, keep in mind the
following factors are considered: (1) the parties' justified expectations;
(2) any resulting forfeiture that would occur if enforcement is denied;
and (3) any special interest in favor of enforcement.' 0
An operator without knowledge of any illegality would justifiably
expect the contract to be enforceable since the illegality is latent."o2
This is particularly the case because § 230 policy goals weigh in favor
of operators tailoring editorial procedures to their needs and abilities.
Recall that § 230 was created in response to the Stratton Oakmont
decision.' 03 If adopted by other courts, the Stratton Oakmont rule
would have made operators liable for content on their websites when
they elected to exercise editorial control over the website, thereby discouraging operators from exercising editorial control.104 Congress encouraged operators to undertake traditional editorial functions by
passing § 230. In this hypothetical, of course, the illegal content was
publicly accessible because the operator failed to exercise complete
editorial control (it did not catch everything). Nevertheless, enforcement does not cut against § 230 policy goals.' When designing their
products, operators have balanced the goal of streamlining transactions against the need for editorial control, which § 230 encourages
them to do. Punishing an operator for discouraging some-but not
all-potentially illegal conduct flies in the face of the statute's purpose
and would create a similar conundrum to the one created by Stratton
Oakmont: operators would be encouraged to cease all screening efforts for fear of catching only some illegality.1 06
It is debatable whether refusing to enforce the contract would cause
an operator to forfeit substantial advertising revenue. Under the preThere the court held that the phrase "[p]erfect for single or couple" was not facially
nondiscriminatory as a matter of law. 865 F. Supp. 492, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (explaining the approach taken by
Second Restatement).
102. The calculus changes somewhat when we assume the operator has detected
illegality but hosted the advertisement anyway. However, § 230 policy favoring operators can be furthered by allowing operators to tailor their editorial functions to the
needs of their websites and financial resources. If an operator wants to remove only
clear-cut instances of heinous illegality, it should have the freedom to do so. This
argument is addressed in greater detail infra.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10 (discussing the Stratton Oakmont
decision).
104. See supra text accompanying note 9 (summarizing the Stratton Oakmont
holding).
105. Cf supra notes 10, 18 (quoting § 230's legislative history, which suggests Congress did not intend to punish operators for blocking some, but not all, undesirable
content).
106. This would frustrate congressional intent to encourage screening. See supra
Section L.A (describing the circumstances surrounding § 230's enactment, including
the Stratton Oakmont decision).
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dominant pay-per-click business model, the forfeiture might be insignificant for a large operator such as Google or Facebook unless a
large-scale content provider declined to pay for a significant number
of "clicks." The inability to recover from one breaching advertiser
will not bring down a large company; however, many breaching advertisers might subject an operator to "death by ten thousand duckbites."o 7 Furthermore, a company like Google, which has a nearly
endless supply of potential advertisers, might be entitled to lost-volume seller damages 08 CoMpounding the effect of nonenforcement.
An operator using a less streamlined approach than Google or
Facebook might suffer in a different way. Assume the operator enters
into a contract under which it agrees to host the content provider's
advertisement for a month. After the advertisement is displayed for
two days, the content provider discovers it is paying significantly
above the market rate and breaches. The operator must then fill its ad
space at the lower market rate. If the difference between the market
rate and the contract rate is significant, restitution would likely provide little relief since it would be difficult to establish a significant
benefit has been conferred. Only expectation damages will make the
operator whole.
The public policy interest in favor of enforcement is strong. Enforcement will promote several § 230 policy objectives, including Congress's desire that the Internet flourish with minimal government
intervention' 0 9 and the goal of "promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media.""o Allowing operators significant autonomy
in establishing new revenue streams also furthers the stated purpose
of promoting e-commerce."' And while Congress did not intend to
promote religiously-based housing decisions, forcing operators to inquire into and edit the substance of all third-party content would slow
transactions and hinder e-commerce.
Furthermore, the FHA's goal of preventing non-discriminatory
housing postings will not be impeded if the contract is enforced; in
fact, the deterrence rationale of nonenforcement'1 2 is better served by
enforcement. Consider Jones v. Phillipson, where the Hawaiian Su-

preme Court permitted the promisee to enforce a contract because
107. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521
F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the threat posed to operators if § 230 cases
are not resolved in favor of operators).
108. See infra discussion accompanying note 124 (discussing the possibility of lostvolume seller damages).
109. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006).
110. See id.
111. Id. § 230(b)(1).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70 (discussing the nonenforcement goal
of deterrence).
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nonenforcement would have aided the more blameworthy party.113
The court held that a defendant contractor could not escape contractual liability by asserting that it (the contractor) was unlicensed and
any contract requiring its services was violative of public policy.1 14
The court concluded that refusing enforcement "would amount to a
forfeiture 'wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy [and] appropriate individual punishment,' and would only 'redound . . . to the benefit' of the [contractor]."'t 5
No new FHA violation will result due to enforcement, since a court
will not grant specific performance that will require party supervision
and forced illegal conduct. The content provider will be forced to pay
damages sufficient to put the operator in as good of a position had the
content provider performed.' 1 6 Forcing the content provider to pay
damages deters it from creating similar ads in the future-furthering
FHA policy goals. And allowing the operator to obtain expectation
damages furthers § 230 values by preserving free market principles
and encouraging the continued development of the Internet." 7 Operators will continue to enter into mutually beneficial arrangements
(contracts) with content providers that will enhance the development
of Internet business models.
This section now turns to whether the policy interests in favor of
enforcement are outweighed by the interests promoted by nonenforcement. Recall that the following factors are considered: (1) the
strength of the policy's legislative or judicial manifestation; (2) the
likelihood that refusal will further that policy; (3) the seriousness of
any misconduct, and whether it was deliberate; and (4) the degree of
the connection between any misconduct and the term.1 8
There are two clearly manifested clashing policies. The FHA is
rather heavy handed. In order to eliminate housing discrimination,
the Act forbids advertisers from expressing certain housing preferences, even if they are facially benign. On the other hand, § 230
places operators on a pedestal, allowing them to play by a different set
of rules. This is, of course, accomplished by forbidding courts from
treating them as publishers,"' which is a requirement for the operator's liability under the FHA.12 0
Reading the statutes together, operators are not within the class the
FHA regulates (when they are not also content providers). That § 230
was passed after the FHA lends support to this reading. The statute
113.
114.
115.
1976))
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Jones v. Phillipson, 987 P.2d 1015, 1026 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Kealakekua Ranch, Ltd., 551 P.2d 525, 528-29 (Haw.
(first two alterations in original).
Whether this is true likely depends on the above damages discussion.
See supra Part I (describing the policy objectives of § 230).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
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can be cast as providing an exception to the FHA for operators. In
other words, the FHA is now only directed at brick-and-mortar advertisers-not operators.
Nonenforcement can, however, promote FHA goals by painting
with a broad brush. Preventing an operator from maintaining an action for breach of contract would send a clear message to operators:
"carefully police your third-party-created advertising content, or it
will be you, not the content provider, who suffers in a contract action." Such a pronouncement might ensure content providers do not
have the opportunity to discriminate, by encouraging operators to forbid the posting of advertisements that might violate the FHA in any
manner and to scrupulously enforce this prohibition.
But nonenforcement frustrates § 230's policy objectives by preventing operators from developing optimal editorial policies and inhibiting
the free flow of information.12 1 The FHA's policy goals can be furthered without resorting to the overdeterrent effect of nonenforcement. Allowing the operator to enforce the contract should have a
deterrent effect on the content provider. This is particularly the case
if the operator has not yet performed; not only has the ad not been
displayed, but the content provider is forced to pay for it anyway. Refusing enforcement would have the exact opposite effect.
Consider the harm caused by nonenforcement. Operators would
need to devote additional resources to screening. The cost of contracting could increase as well, as some parties might need to negotiate provisions that would allocate loss to one party in the event of
nonenforcement. Both of these possibilities might restrict the current
streamlined approaches used by Google and Facebook,12 2 conflicting
with § 230 policy objectives. Furthermore, recall that without § 230,
operators would have to refrain from editing content-provider created
content. Inappropriate and illegal content might overrun their websites, destroying the website's commercial viability.
If enforcement is generally permitted, the increase in illegal content
on many websites would be limited because operators still have ample
incentives not to host illegal content. Many operators seeking to confine their websites to hosting legal advertisements and other content
will want to prevent their websites from being overrun. If an operator
gains a reputation for hosting illegal advertisements-particularly discriminatory ones-the value of advertising on the operator's site
121. One might counter this argument by pointing out that 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)
encourages the development of "blocking and filtering technology." However, this
subsection encourages operators to create filtering technology that is available to
users so that they can screen out "objectionable or inappropriate online material." Id.
Therefore, this policy objective actually encourages operators to let objectionable
content remain if they so choose, and to let users decide what websites they wish to
filter through the use of filtering technology.
122. See generally supra Part II (describing the AdWords and Facebook advertising
methods).
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would likely decline. Thus, operators have incentives to find the
proper balance of policing their own websites. Unfortunately, this will
not always deter lax editorial control. Roommates.com is a prime example of this phenomena, where allowing discriminatory conduct to
flourish may have helped an operator's bottom line. But assuming
courts adhere to a laissez faire approach to Internet content regulation, which was emphasized by Congress when it enacted the CDA,
enforcement generally better serves public-policy objectives.
It is important to note that the enforcement of such a contract
would only be in the form of damages. A court would not use its
equitable powers to supervise the two parties and force the content
provider to provide advertising content. Awarding damages would
not be unprecedented, as several courts have allowed a plaintiff to
maintain an action for the price even when the plaintiff has sold goods
to a defendant with knowledge that the defendant intends to utilize or
resell those goods in an illegal manner.12 3
Courts might take a variety of approaches in calculating damages.
If an advertiser breaches and the operator cannot acquire a substitute
advertiser, the operator should have no problem acquiring lost revenue through damages. If an operator fills the ad spot, the operator
should have to establish that it is akin to a "lost volume seller" with
regard to that ad space to recover damages. In other words, the operator would likely need to show that it has a nearly infinite supply of ad
space. This is not a problem for Google, which shows a new batch of
ads every time someone runs a Google search, but might present
problems for websites that have a finite amount of ad space. Then
again, non-search-engine websites could argue that because ads often
change every time a page is refreshed, they also have an infinite
amount of ad space. 24
It is unlikely that considerations of misconduct and the deliberate
nature of any misconduct render the contract unenforceable-especially when the operator is not aware of the illegality. In these situations, courts have often stated that the innocent party may enforce the
contract.125 Therefore, enforcement should not be refused due to misconduct when the operator lacks knowledge of the illegality. 126
When the operator is aware of the illegality, the misconduct factor
is a murkier issue. Consider a slight variation on the original fact pat123. See GIESEL, supra note 56, § 89.3, at 618-22, 620 n.7, 624-25.
124. This is by no means a complete analysis of damages calculations, which would
require a significant technical discussion beyond the scope of this Article.
125. See, e.g., Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int'l Energy Dev. Corp., 981
S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) ("Under such circumstances, where one party is unaware of the true facts and believes the contract is
lawful, the general rule that an illegal contract is unenforceable does not apply.").
126. The final factor, the degree of connection between the misconduct and contractual term, has no bearing here, since the operator has not engaged in any form of
misconduct.
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tern. This time, the advertisement arrives at the screener's desk as
follows: "Featured Neighborhood: $350,000 4-5BR 4-5.5BA No
Kids." Assume the operator's screeners are somewhat educated in
fair housing law, realize that the advertisement might violate the
FHA, but elect to permit the ad to be created anyway.
This scenario is similar to cases addressing bargains involving lawful
performances by parties with knowledge of the other party's wrongful
purpose. In these types of situations, courts will often permit enforcement by the innocent party provided the other party does not intend
to further "an act or crime of great moral turpitude." 127 While the
operator's knowledge cannot be ignored, it is not significant enough to
bar enforcement under a variety of approaches to this issue.
Belmont v. Jones House FurnishingCo. 128 is one of many cases that

allowed a promisee to enforce a contract despite the promisee's
knowledge of the promisor's illegal purpose. The defendant argued
that she should be able to avoid paying for the furniture she had purchased because the plaintiff knew the furniture was intended for a
brothel operated by the defendant.' 2 9 The court sided with the plaintiff for two reasons: first, the consideration furnished by the plaintiff,
furniture, was not the type of thing that could only be used in a
"bawdy house"; and second, the plaintiff did not derive any profits
from the defendant's "bawdy" business.13 0 Belmont is a prime example of two issues related to the degree of the promisee's participation
in the illegality that help distinguish cases allowing enforcement and
those opting for nonenforcement. The first issue is whether the
consideration supplied by the promisee is legally neutral or readily
capable of a legal use.' 3 ' The second is whether the promisee is a
127. GIESEL, supra note 56, § 89.3, at 618-19 (citing Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342,
346 (1870)).
128. Belmont v. Jones House Furnishing Co., 125 S.W. 651 (Ark. 1910).
129. Id. at 652.
130. Id.
131. Compare Jacobs v. Danciger, 41 S.W.2d 389, 391-93 (Mo. 1931) (knowledge of
buyer's intention to use hops to illegally manufacture "home brew" insufficient to
result in nonenforcement), and Samuel Bowman Distilling Co. v. Nutt, 10 P. 163
(Kan. 1886) (allowing the promisee to bring an action for the price when it sold liquor
to the promisor knowing the promisor intended to resell the liquor in an illegal manner), with Chateau v. Singla, 45 P. 1015, 1015-16 (Cal. 1896) ("If this contract of
copartnership had for its purpose the letting of apartments for purposes of prostitution . .. then the copartnership contract was illegal, against good morals, against public policy, and against the express mandate of the statute, and equity would no more
entertain an action founded upon such contract for the relief of either of the parties to
it, than it would entertain an action between two thieves for an equitable division of
their plunder."), and Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655 (1869) (preventing the promisee
from enforcing a contract when the promisee knew the promisor was purchasing liquor in order to sell it in violation of the law, and aided the promisor in doing so by
helping the promisor conceal the liquor). That consideration is capable of being used
legally may not be sufficient to help stave off nonenforcement. It should be reasonable to believe that the consideration is something that will generally be used legally.
This can be a fine line. Consider Mills Novelty Co. v. King, 174 Ill. App. 559 (1912).
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participant in or benefactor of the illegal conduct. 1 3 2
Under the Belmont approach, an operator's detection of illegality in
a potential advertisement does not hinder its ability to enforce the
contract. The service supplied by the operator can obviously be used
for both legal and illegal purposes. The advertising service must, in
fact, remain neutral to maintain its immunity. If the operator facilitates only illegal content, it will run afoul of the underlying illegality
test.133 It is the content provider's unique use of the web hosting service, like the Belmont defendant's bawdy use of the furniture, which
converts a neutral instrumentality into an enabler of illegality.
The best argument in favor of nonenforcement under Belmont is
that an operator is entitled to revenue only when a user clicks on the
content provider's illegal ad.13 4 In other words, the operator directly
benefits from the illegality. But while the operator's profits are tied to
the illegal content, the operator is not promoting the illegal nature of
the advertisement. Instead, the operator merely profits from illegality
when it fails to reject the ad during its review of potential ads.13 5 FurThe court refused to enforce a contract because the subject matter was a "gambling
device" even though it could be used as a slot machine or a chewing gum dispenser.
Id. at 562-63. However, the case cannot be said to stand for the proposition that
supplying neutral devices that can be readily used illegally prohibits a promisee from
recovering. The court's decision rested on its determination that the preponderance
of the evidence indicated the machines were illegal gambling machines, and suggests
that it simply did not believe that they could have any other purpose besides gambling. See id. ("The fact that they could also be used for selling gum, and that Mills
testified that he did not know for which of such uses they were in fact purchased, does
not, we think, even tend to prove that the machines sold were not gambling devices."). This view is supported by the court's statement that the promisee could not
"reasonably expect that the purchaser intended to use . . . [the machines] for selling

gum." Id. Mills Novelty, therefore, indicates that consideration supplied by the
promisee should not be something that is unlikely to be used legally.
132. Compare Tyler v. Carlisle, 9 A. 356 (Me. 1887) (allowing the promisee to bring
an action to recover money loaned to the promisor when the promisee knew the
promisor intended to use the money for illegal gambling), with Emerson v. Townsend,
20 A. 984 (Md. 1890) (preventing the promisee from collecting on a note made in
connection with an illegal card game the two were playing), Shaffner v. Pinchback, 24
N.E. 867 (111. 1890) (preventing the promisee from recovering a loan made in connection with a bookmaking business when promisee was to receive a portion of profits
from the bookmaking operation), and White v. Buss, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 448 (1849)
(promisee could not recover a loan made to promisor to be used for the purpose of
illegal gambling when the loan was made at a time and place when both were
gambling).
133. For an explanation of the underlying illegality test, see supra Section I.B. Refer to Part II for a discussion of interactive website advertising business models and
an explanation of their relationship with § 230. For a discussion of the specific application of the underlying illegality test to Google's AdWords service in Goddard v.
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009), see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part II (discussing the interactive website advertising business models and explaining their relationship with § 230).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 (describing the AdWords creation
process).
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thermore, the operator is voluntarily self-policing its website, in accordance with § 230 policy objectives.
An operator should not be prevented from enforcing a contract
simply because the operator discovers potentially illegal content and
fails to remove it. Operators do not lose immunity by failing to remove illegal content after discovering it.1 36 And it would be perfectly
reasonable for an operator to create an internal policy under which
only the most egregious or blatant forms of illegality are removed
from advertisements, so long as the operator does not promote illegal
conduct. This proposition meshes with § 230 policy objectives because
operators are able to customize their editorial efforts based on their
resources and level of expertise, which would have been impossible
under the all-or-nothing Stratton Oakmont regime. 3 7 Punishing the
operator for failing to eliminate all illegality it detects will only encourage the operator to detect less illegality. Operators would have
an incentive to scrap their screening efforts altogether.
The Second Restatement expands on the Belmont approach: when
the promisee has substantially performed, enforcement of the promisor's promise is not precluded due to the promisee's knowledge of an
improper purpose related to the contract unless (1) the promisee's
conduct was intended to further the improper purpose; or (2) the
promisee knew of the improper purpose, and that purpose "involves
grave social harm." 138 The Belmont analysis should satisfy the first
prong of the restatement analysis. With respect to the second prong,
the FHA violation should not be serious enough to prevent enforcement simply because the operator has knowledge of an improper purpose. The restatement suggests the operator must know the content
provider has a truly horrendous purpose, such as a "threat to human
life," in order to justify nonenforcement.13 9 Therefore, under the Restatement's treatment of a promisee that had knowledge of the promisor's improper purpose, the "misconduct" factor would not weigh
against an operator.
136. See supra note 46 (discussing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328,
332-33 (4th Cir. 1997)).

137. See supra Section L.A (describing the circumstances surrounding § 230's enactment, including the Stratton Oakmont decision).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 182 (1981). Section 182 purports

to resolve the entire § 178 balancing test whenever the promisee has substantially
performed. See id. cmt. a ("This Section states a rule that determines when this is so
by resolving the problem of balancing in such a case. Situations that do not come
within it because the promisee has not substantially performed are governed by the
general rule stated in § 178."). But § 182's approach is a bit of an oversimplification
that fails to take into account the unique conflicting public policy situation presented
by § 230 and the FHA. Furthermore, it does not address the best way to deter illegal
conduct. As such, this Article treats § 182 as part of the § 178 analysis, rather than a
dispositive inquiry.
139. Id. § 182 cmt. b.
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Some courts presume the criminalization of malum prohibituml4 0
acts indicate a legislative intent not to punish the offender beyond the
statutorily prescribed legal sanction when the legislative goals can be
accomplished without nonenforcement.141 The analysis adds an additional step to that of the Restatement, but the result is the same. The
malum in se designation is a high bar. And while an FHA violation is
no laughing matter, it is not on par with a rape, murder, or assault. In
fact, there are FHA exceptions that permit individuals to engage in
housing discrimination under certain circumstances. 142 Therefore, an
FHA violation is unlikely to qualify as malum in se.
Furthermore, the FHA's policy can still be furthered without nonenforcement. Recall the discussion above, explaining that allowing
enforcement will have a deterrent effect on content providers. Resorting to nonenforcement is not necessary to deter conduct that violates
the FHA, and as explained above, the slight benefit derived from refusing enforcement would frustrate the public policy goals of § 230.
As such, the malum prohibitum-malum in se approach does not harm

the operator's efforts to enforce the contract.
Finally, if one concludes that the misconduct factor is a close call, or
even that it weighs in favor of nonenforcement, it is but one of many
factors in the Restatement's public policy framework. Because the
freedom of contract is itself a form of public policy, the factors weighing against enforcement must "substantially" outweigh the factors supporting enforcement.14 3 Thus, even under a critical eye, the operator
that fails to remove illegal ads should defeat a content provider asserting the void-for-public-policy doctrine.
2. When the Content Provider Seeks to Enforce a Contract
The scales tilt in favor of nonenforcement when a content provider
asserts the doctrine. A cursory glance at the restatement factors demonstrates the operator will be able to defend on void-for-public-policy
140. An act is malum prohibitum when it becomes "wrong" only because it is prohibited by statute. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 73 (2008). An act is malum in se, on
the other hand, when it is "naturally evil." Id. This would include crimes such as
murder and rape.
141. See, e.g., Warren People's Mkt. Co. v. Corbett & Sons, 151 N.E. 51, 53 (Ohio
1926) ("When a statute imposes specific penalties for its violation, where the act is not
malum in se, and the purpose of the statute can be accomplished without declaring
contracts in violation thereof illegal, the inference is that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to render such contracts illegal and unenforceable, and the court must
examine the entire statute to discover whether the Legislature intended to prevent
courts from enforcing contracts based on the act prohibited, and, unless it does so
appear, only the penalties imposed by the statute can be enforced." (quoting In re
T.H. Bunch Co., 180 F. 519, 527 (E.D. Ark. 1910))); GIESEL, supra note 56, § 79.5, at
24-26.
142. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006) (providing exemptions to
anti-discrimination laws). There are, of course exceptions to murder and assault-self
defense, for example.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (emphasis added).
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grounds for two reasons: first, the content provider is the source of the
illegality; and second, Congress did not intend for § 230 to protect
content providers. But when would the content provider even be able
to bring a contract action? It seems that this is unlikely to occur under
the Google or Facebook pay-per-clock models where operator bargaining power is strongest. If the content provider only pays when an
ad is clicked, and Google pulls the ad because of content, then the
content provider cannot argue that it has been harmed since Google is
not obligated to host any ad submitted by content providers.
One situation in which a content provider would bring suit is when
the operator is obligated to host an advertisement for a certain period
of time. For instance, assume the content provider, who is in the business of marketing homes in newly built subdivisions, is hosting an
open-house event. The content provider wants to post a banner on a
website for the entire month preceding the event. Consider the primary example from Section 1, above. The advertisement reads: "Featured Home: $299,000 4BR 3.5 BA Several Christian churches nearby,
great family-values oriented neighborhood." Again, the subdivision
will not allow non-Christians to purchase a home. The operator does
not detect the illegality and agrees to host it for a month. But when
the operator eventually discovers the religious discrimination, the operator pulls the ad, and the content provider reacts by bringing suit.
Despite the potential economic harm the content provider may incur, it will be hard-pressed to recover because it supplied the illegal
content. The content provider would not be justified in expecting to
enforce the contract. The FHA clearly applies to brick-and-mortar
advertisers, and § 230(c) explicitly excludes content providers from
immunity. As such, the content provider should expect the contract to
be unenforceable. The resulting forfeiture is a factor that might weigh
in favor of enforcement. The loss could be significant for the content
provider if the breaching operator discovered the market rate was significantly higher. The content provider would then need to procure
advertising space at a higher rate, and possibly, at a significantly weakened bargaining position due to time restrictions. This seems inconsequential, however, when balanced against the content provider's
knowing or reckless violation of the FHA.
On the other hand, nonenforcement will simultaneously promote
the deterrence goal of the void-for-public-policy doctrine and the
FHA's policy objectives. Content providers will be strongly discouraged from contracting in this manner. Allowing the content provider
to enforce the contract cannot further § 230 or FHA policy goals. Enforcing these types of contracts would force operators to scrutinize all
content more strenuously. It is also worth noting that enforcing the
contract would work an ironic result. If the content provider brought
suit under these circumstances, it would be subject to liability under
the FHA if the operator did not remove them. The operator has actu-
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ally done the content provider a favor by taking the ad down. Traditional wariness of supervising specific performance aside, a court
would never grant the content provider specific performance because
doing so would force the operator to host an illegal advertisement. In
sum, the reasons for nonenforcement substantially outweigh the potential financial cost to the content provider.
3. Result: One-sided Voidability
Contracts impacted by § 230 are in many ways analogous to existing
categories of contracts that are voidable at the option of only one
party to the contract."
The void-for-public-policy doctrine seeks to
deter undesirable conduct by refusing contractual enforcement.
When an operator brings suit, nonenforcement would frustrate § 230
policy objectives and do little to deter conduct that violates a substantive area of law. Consequently, refusing to enforce the contract would
be an improper use of the doctrine. When a content provider brings
suit, on the other hand, enforcement should be refused because it will
deter the content provider-who falls under the purview of the substantive area of law-from engaging in future undesirable conduct.
This phenomena is perhaps best described as one-sided voidability.
C.

Other Applications and Media Implications

The one-sided-void-for-public-policy approach largely benefits the
media as a whole, but it can also help members of the media gain
competitive advantages over one another. This section briefly discusses § 230 outside the context of the FHA, explaining how media
operators can leverage the statute in their favor when they are dealing
with potentially defamatory content. Section 230 is an obvious benefit
for websites that are supported by advertisements created by other
content providers. This will likely be the case for most websites that
merely host, rather than create, advertisements. Although bloggers
and online-news-site publishers are content providers with regard to
most of their websites' content, they cannot be held responsible for
the pay-per-click advertisements that support the website; nor can
they be held responsible for user comments generated through open
text boxes. They are "operators"-and only operators-entitling
them to § 230 protection with respect to this content. 145
Stepping away from Internet advertising schemes, media operators
are in a particularly strong position when they can classify blog or
144. These categories include contracts affected by infancy and mental infirmity.
See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 145 (1999).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32 (stating that under the Roommates.
com decision, the use of open text boxes does not trigger the exception to § 230
immunity).
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news contributors as contractors.14 6 Consider the scenario presented
by Blumenthal v. Drudge, where AOL prevailed in a defamation suit
by using a § 230 defense.147 AOL entered into a contract with Matt
Drudge, who operates the Drudge Report (a political news website),
which made the Drudge Report available to AOL subscribers. 148 The
plaintiff brought a defamation suit against Drudge and AOL based on
the content of one of Drudge's articles.14 9 The court classified Drudge
as a contractor rather than an employee or other agent. 5 o While
AOL paid Drudge to make his content available through the AOL
network, the court held AOL had merely provided an interactive computer service, and was not liable for the content of Drudge's
articles.1 51
Website operators can use the reasoning in Drudge to their advantage. Assume a website operator contracts to buy the exclusive rights
to a significant news story from an independent journalist. After the
journalist posts the story on the website, it turns out to be completely
contrived and defames numerous individuals who would be considered "private" plaintiffs under defamation case law. Can the website
operator, which is entitled to § 230 immunity, refuse to pay the journalist and defend against a breach of contract claim by arguing the
contract violates public policy? The website should be able to achieve
the same result as in the FHA or defamatory advertising scenarios.
This time, there is a closer connection between § 230 and the illegality.
There is no need to hypothesize as to whether Congress truly intended
to allow operators to evade liability under defamation theories: Congress's reaction to Stratton Oakmont confirms defamation claims were
clearly contemplated.152 This strengthens most of the arguments addressed in Section B (to the extent they are not applicable solely to
the FHA).
The analysis might change slightly, however, having left the realm
of purely commercial speech. The reporter (who is the content provider) could counter with a First Amendment policy argument: a win
146. This could occur when a gossip blog advertises on another website by using a
defamatory ad-perhaps a misleading headline combined with a person's picture.
Fully analyzing whether this is in fact the case is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
worth noting, however, that the situation analyzed above in Part III is analogous in
several respects-particularly when the operator is unaware of the defamatory nature
of a post.
147. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48-53 (D.D.C. 1998). Matt Drudge,
who was the content provider, lost his motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction
ground. Id. at 58.
148. Id. at 47. Drudge was paid $3000 per month. Id.
149. Id. at 46-48.
150. See id. at 50 ("It also is apparent to the Court that there is no evidence to
support the view originally taken by plaintiffs that Drudge is or was an employee or
agent of AOL, and plaintiffs seem to have all but abandoned that argument.").
151. See id. at 49-53.
152. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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for the website might have the effect of chilling the press's speech
because the impending defamation suit will compound the journalist's
economic loss. Not only will the journalist not realize his agreed-upon
fee for producing the article, but he could also be liable to the defamed individuals as well. Such a result could discourage investigative
journalism, detracting from the press's ability to fulfill its watchdog
role. While analyzing the merit of this defense is beyond the scope of
this Article, it seems that as the journalist's blameworthiness for the
inaccuracy decreases, the merit of the defense would increase.153
Websites that are willing to use contractors-rather than employees-to provide most of their content are likely to be the greatest beneficiaries, both in "regular"154 liability prevention § 230 cases and in
contract suits. They can substantially insulate themselves from liability in contract and in noncontract cases. By taking the approach utilized by AOL in Drudge, a website would not be the content provider
of those portions of its website, while still allowing it to exercise substantial editorial control of the content.' 5 5 Furthermore, if content
turns out to be defamatory, the operator might be able to recover
money paid for the content or avoid paying the author's fee. These
two benefits can substantially reduce legal expenses for operators because they can avoid the cost of paying lawyers to screen content prior
to hosting it for public consumption.
CONCLUSION

Modern website advertising methods are tailor-made for a § 230 defense should the advertisement contain legally-sanctionable conduct.
When § 230 is invoked, conflicting policy objectives presented by
§ 230 and "real-world" laws are evident. A content provider can be
liable for content hosted by the operator, while the operator is held
blameless. One party has run afoul of public policy, and the other has
not. The balancing test created by the Second Restatement of Contracts is the appropriate manner to determine whether a party can
avoid contractual enforcement on public-policy grounds. The balancing test allows courts to further deterrence goals, which are in keeping
with modern contract theory. When a contract between an operator
and a content provider exists and illegality is present in the contract,
153. The situation would present several difficulties for a court. For instance, is it
sufficient that the operator merely has a reasonable belief that the content is defamatory? Or should the operator be required to actually establish that if it had published
the content, such content would have been defamatory? Furthermore, how should
defamation privileges and heightened burdens of proof for public matters factor in?
154. This would be a case in which an operator is trying to avoid liability for the
content posted on its site in a lawsuit by a third party.
155. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Thus,
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content-are barred.").
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the operator should be able to avoid enforcement if it is entitled to
§ 230 immunity. The content provider, on the other hand, should
have no such privilege.
The inherent conflict between § 230 and the FHA provides an example of one-sided voidability. When online advertisements created
through the popular pay-per-click model violate the FHA, website operators will be able to avoid liability for the FHA violation and any
contract claim brought by the content provider. Under the Second
Restatement's balancing test, the interest in enforcing the contract
against the content provider is significant-particularly because it will
help deter future illegal conduct. On the other hand, allowing the
content provider to enforce the contract against the operator does not
deter illegal conduct without unduly disrupting § 230's policy goals.
Instead, it can encourage illegal conduct by content providers.
The one-sided void-for-public-policy approach is yet another advantage that Internet media have over traditional print (and other traditional) media. Section 230 already gives websites a competitive
advantage by significantly decreasing legal fees. By keeping clear of
the ad-creation process, a website can avoid liability for anything contained in the ad. Furthermore, by contracting out for website content
rather than utilizing website employees, an operator can even avoid
liability for the main content on its website.
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